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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the effect of European monetary policies on
Eurozone countries’ sovereign risks.We control for interdependencies
across individual variables within and across countries using a global
VAR specification weighting transmission by their fiscal position. We
find evidence of positive correlation between sovereign bond CDS
and risk aversion for almost all countries in the Eurozone. The effects
are larger after the 2012 Greek debt crisis. When the ECB increases its
refinancing rate or there is a decline in money aggregates (i.e., M3),
we observe an increase in sovereign bonds’ risk of all countries
(except Greece). In contrast, monetary policy tightening shocks
have the opposite impact on Greece due to a differentiation effect.
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1. Introduction
The 2007–2008 financial turmoil urged governments of advanced economies to step in
to the center of financial systems and assume the risk of privately held debt across
capital markets. Consecutive bail-outs and governments’ intervention to protect “too
big to fail” institutions led to a stream of risk transmission from private financial sector
to public sector, eventually leading to a lack of investor confidence in sovereign debt. As
a result, spillover and contagion among countries attracted great attention after global
financial crisis. With multiple European countries being in the center of debt troubles,
the rapidly weakening situation in the 'Eurozone attracted a number of empirical papers
covering the issues of sovereign risk in the euro area. Most importantly, the debt crisis
in Greece, Ireland and Portugal (later Italy and Spain too) focused the attention of the
sovereign bond spreads literature on the interdependence of countries’ risks.
This paper contributes to the understanding of (i) how monetary policies affect
sovereign risk, (ii) international linkages among sovereign risks and, (iii) heterogeneity
among Eurozone countries, using an econometric specification of credit default swaps
(CDS) as a proxy of country-specific sovereign risk.
The literature on sovereign risks and contagion is very extensive and it has recently
focused on Europe. Most papers analyze the contagion mechanism and study its determi-
nants. Dungey and Martin (2007) analyzes the linkage between countries and financial
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markets and find significant evidence of spillovers and contagion during the East Asian
financial crisis of 1997–98. Fratzscher (2009) studies the transmission channels of US
shocks to foreign exchange markets and finds that macroeconomic variables and financial
exposure are important elements of transmission for both advanced and emergingmarkets.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) examine the spread of shocks in global equity markets using
variance decomposition methods. Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) provides evidence on
the importance of monetary shocks. Niehof (2014) finds that foreign shocks have a higher
effect on countries with higher debts, and European bond markets are primarily driven by
European shocks. There is also evidence of global interdependency and determinants of
volatility of bond spread changes across countries.
There is strong evidence of co-movement of government bond spreads in the Euro area (see
Figure 1). Government spreads statistical processes are generally decomposed into three main
factors: risk aversion, fiscal factors and liquidity factors (see Codogno, Favero, Missale, Portes,
& Thum, 2003; Geyer, Kossmeier, & Pichler, 2004; Haugh, Ollivaud, & Turner, 2009;
Manganelli & Wolswijk, 2009). Appetite for risk is an important driver of the variation in
sovereign bond spreads in the Euro area. US corporate bond spreads, as a proxy of global risk
measure, is found statistically significant factor of European bond spreads (Codogno et al.,
2003; Geyer et al., 2004; Manganelli &Wolswijk, 2009; Sgherri & Zoli, 2009). With the start of
Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union (EMU) and until the middle of 2008,
sovereign bond yields for EMU member countries remained relatively close to each other.
However, after late 2008 with financial markets realizing the impact of the crisis, sovereign
bond yield spreads between Germany and other Euro area countries started to widen sig-
nificantly. Recent studies also confirm that the start of EMU and 2008–09 financial crisis



























































































Average 5−yr Sovereign CDS Spread
Figure 1. Monthly average 5 years sovereign CDS spread (in basis points).
Note: CDS relative to CDS of German Bunds have seen two stress periods in last 10 years. First, CDS spreads in Eurozone
increased sharply in 2008/09 global financial crisis. Between mid-2009 and mid-2011, CDS spread in the zone decreases,
however with the start of euro area crisis in May 2010, CDS spreads move up sharply.
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and find that Germany was perceived as a “safe-haven” in international financial market after
2008–09 financial crisis (Bernoth, von Hagen, and Schuknecht (2012)).
The second common determinants are fiscal fundamentals and economic growth. Bernoth
and Wolff (2008); Bernoth et al. (2012); Favero (2013) examine the effect of both debt and
deficit on bond spreads. Assmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012) use time-varying approach and
find debt to GDP ratio is the most important factor which can explain fluctuation in govern-
ment bond spreads. Sovereign bond spreads become an interesting area to analyze after
2008–09 sovereign debt crisis and studies on government bond spread started to investigate
whether yields co-movements differ over time. Fiscal fundamentals are time-varying factors
and European co-movement differs over time (Assmann & Boysen-Hogrefe, 2012; Attinasi,
Checherita, &Nickel, 2010; Barrios, Iversen, Lewandowska, & Setzer, 2009; Bernoth et al., 2012;
Borgy, Laubach, Mesonnier, & Renne, 2011; Sgherri & Zoli, 2009).
The third commonly used determinant of spread yields is liquidity risk. This a very
important factor as countries within the Euro area have not perfect control over monetary
decisions which are taken by the central institutions, i.e., European Central Bank (ECB). We
consider the effect monetary shocks by studyingM3 and ECB refinancing rate in our model as
the main determinants of the Eurozone liquidity. We thus study how liquidity shocks and
monetary policy in general affects euro countries’ CDS. There are different results on the
importance of liquidity on government bonds. Favero, Pagano, and von Thadden (2010) do
not find liquidity as a significant factor in sovereign bond spreads, and show that liquidity is not
independent from default risk and risk aversion.
Niehof (2014) also defines a fourth element which is financial market risk of spillover
due to evidence in the literature of co-movement of bonds market and stocks market.
This is especially relevant for countries in the EMU that have the same currency, and as
such, they are connected with strong links that go to European central institutions.
We apply a global VAR (GVAR) model of Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004),
Chudik and Fratzscher (2011) and Chudik and Pesaran (2011). This is a framework for
capturing interdependence and spillovers allowing for common factors and time-varying
components. We model government bond CDS relative to Germany by domestic, global,
monetary and weighted foreign variables where weights are calculated using their fiscal
position. We include two factors that determine the fluctuation in government bond CDS
similar to Favero (2013); a local factor (fiscal fundamentals and growth), and a global factor
(market’s appetite for risk). While the GVAR method has been widely used in regional
contexts to evaluate monetary policy, this is not the only alternative model. For instance,
factor-augmented models, spatial and Bayesianmethods also provide alternatives to reduce
the dimensionality in an inter-connected empirical model with interdependence and spil-
lovers. A recent and extensive summary of regional models to study monetary shocks
appears in Dominguez-Torres and Hierro (2019).
We find evidence of positive correlation between sovereign bond CDS and risk aversion for
almost all countries in the Eurozone. Monetary shocks in the Eurozone have large and
heterogeneous effects in the countries that share the Euro. When ECB increases its refinancing
rate, we observe an increase in risk of sovereign bonds of all countries in the Euro area (except
Greece). A decline inmoney aggregates (i.e., M3) leads to increasing sovereign risk. In contrast,
monetary policies have the opposite impact on Greece, possibly due to a differentiation effect.
That is, a general improvement (deterioration) of the Eurozone countries’ risk might relatively
worsen (improves) the Greek market valuation.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
on measuring monetary shocks. Section 3 presents the econometric model. In section 4,
we describe data and study sovereign bond CDS with 5 years maturity. In section 5, we
provide the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Monetary shocks in the Eurozone
Financial and non-financial markets are unlikely to respond to policy actions that were
already anticipated. That is, central banks actions are systematically related to economic
variables (i.e., inflation, output gap) which are both observed by the national govern-
ments, international institutions and economic agents, then anticipatory responses
occur before the actual change happens (i.e., a tightening of the monetary policy,
increment of the interest rate). In that case it is difficult to identify the causal effect
of monetary policy on financial markets. Distinguishing thus between expected and an
unexpected policy action is a key fundamental challenge of the literature, and for this
the definition of what is a shock and how it is constructed varies.
This has been a topic of continuous interest in the US, where the Federal Reserve Bank
(Fed) actions were systematically analyzed. Since Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Sims
(1992), a considerable literature employed vector autoregressive (VAR)methods to identify
and measure these shocks. The canonical methodology of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (1996) propose to measure exogenous monetary shocks using orthogonalized shocks
to the Fed funds rate (FFR) in a structural VARmodel. The system is identified by assuming
that Fed behavior has no contemporary effect on other “real” economic variables, but it
takes these into account for policy actions.
Many other alternative methodologies have been proposed in the literature. Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005) follow Kuttner (2001) in using FFR futures data to construct a measure of
“surprise” rate changes. They use the event study analysis of comparing the future 1-month
futures contract with the actual target rate set by the Fed. The economic rationale is that future
interest rates reflect expectations about monetary policies, and thus, deviations of the actual
rate from the predicted one by the futures market represent a shock. Their approach over-
comes some of the problems encountered by Christiano et al. (1996) VAR such as the time
invariant parameter issue and omitted-variable bias. These “surprise”measures of monetary
policy are based only on the actual/observed policy rate. These might not fully capture
monetary policy shocks for two reasons. First, agents might be able to anticipate changes in
the policy rate but might be surprised about the path of monetary policy. Second, recent
changes in monetary policy, such as reaching the zero lower bound and the use of unconven-
tional monetary policy, might make FFR-based measures superfluous.
The literature emphasizes that monetary policy is multi-dimensional. Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005), among others, make an important distinction between
measures of surprises on the target rate (target shocks) and surprises on the path of
monetary policy (path shocks). While Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and Christiano et al.
(1996) shocks fall within the category of target shocks, because they capture the
unanticipated variation in monetary policy that is reflected in the current reaction of
the policy instrument, path shocks intend to capture shocks to the path of monetary
policy. Path shocks correspond to the surprises about future policy that can be inferred
from forward guidance and/or other communications by the Board members.
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Intuitively, path shocks allow assessing agents’ expectations about the evolution of
monetary policy. These shocks are based on expectations about the path of the FFR
controlling for forecasts about the evolution of the inflation and output gap.
Econometric models for the US have particular features that cannot be found in Euro
area countries.While the ECB is the central bank of the Euro area countries, its policies may
not be directly linked to individual countries performance but to more aggregate perfor-
mance at the Eurozone. The primary objective of the ECB, as laid down in Article 127(1) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, is to maintain price stability within
the Eurozone. The Governing Council in October 1998 defined price stability as inflation of
under 2%, “a year-on-year increase in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
for the Euro area of below 2%” and added that price stability “was to bemaintained over the
medium term”. The basic tasks, as defined in Article 3 of the Statute, are to define and
implement the monetary policy for the Eurozone, to conduct foreign exchange operations,
to take care of the foreign reserves of the European System of Central Banks and operation
of the financial market infrastructure under the TARGET2 payments system and the
technical platform (currently being developed) for settlement of securities in Europe
(TARGET2 Securities). The ECB has, under Article 16 of its Statute, the exclusive right
to authorize the issuance of Euro banknotes. Member states can issue Euro coins, but the
amount must be authorized by the ECB beforehand (upon the introduction of the Euro, the
ECB also had exclusive right to issue coins). The principal monetary policy tool of the
European central bank is collateralized borrowing or repo agreements. These tools are also
used by the US Fed, but the Fed does more direct purchasing of financial assets than its
European counterpart. The collateral used by the ECB is typically high quality public and
private sector debt.
Unlike the US Fed, the ECB has only one primary objective but this objective has
never been defined in statutory law, and the HICP target can be termed ad-hoc. In fact,
the ECB has been at the center of the recent European crisis with interventions that
exceeded its original mandate. On 9 May 2010, the 27 member states of the European
Union agreed to incorporate the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The
EFSF’s mandate is to safeguard financial stability in Europe by providing financial
assistance to Eurozone member states. The EFSF is authorized to use the following
instruments linked to appropriate conditionality:
(i) To provide loans to countries in financial difficulties (e.g., Greek bailout);
(ii) To intervene in the primary and secondary debt markets. Intervention in the
secondary debt market will be only on the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing
the existence of exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial
stability.
(iii) Act on the basis of a precautionary program.
(iv) Finance recapitalization of financial institutions through loans to governments.
Both for US and Europe, the classical tools of monetary policy (i.e., FFR for the US,
managing the ECB refinancing rate for the ECB) lost its flexibility and effectiveness as it
reached the zero lower bound. US monetary authorities gradually changed its policy
instruments by considering forward guidance and QE (Quantitative Easing).1 In con-
trast to the Fed, the ECB normally does not buy bonds outright. The normal procedure
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used by the ECB for manipulating the money supply has been via the so-called
refinancing facilities. In these facilities, bonds are not purchased but used in reverse
transactions: repurchase agreements, or collateralized loans. These two transactions are
similar, i.e., bonds are used as collateral for loans, the difference being of legal nature. In
the repos the ownership of the collateral changes to the ECB until the loan is repaid.
This changed with the recent sovereign-debt crisis. The ECB always could, and through
the late summer of 2011 did, purchase bonds issued by the weaker states even though it
assumes, in doing so, the risk of a deteriorating balance sheet. As of 18 June 2012, the ECB
in total had spent 212.1bn (equal to 2.2% of the Eurozone GDP) for bond purchases
covering outright debt, as part of its Securities Markets Programme (SMP) running since
May 2010. On 6 September 2012, the ECB announced a new plan for buying bonds from
Eurozone countries. The duration of the previous SMP was temporary, while the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT) program has no ex-ante time or size limit. On
4 September 2014, the bank went further by announcing it would buy bonds and other
debt instruments primarily from banks in a bid to boost the availability of credit for
businesses. The Emergency Lending Assistance (ELA) program was designed for financial
institutions in a liquidity crisis, such as the Greek banks in the course of the 2015 Greek
financial snafu, when the banks experienced massive deposit flight. On 9 March 2015 the
ECB started its own Quantitative Easing program, which was designed to ease sovereign
stress in its member states. Purchases are 60bn per month. The program is expected to last
until at least September 2016. Though the ECB’s main refinancing operations (MRO) are
from repo auctions with a (bi)weekly maturity and monthly maturation, the ECB now
conducts long-term refinancing operations (LTROs), maturing after 3 months, 6 months,
12 months and 36 months. In 2003, refinancing via LTROs amounted to €45bn which is
about 20% of overall liquidity provided by the ECB.
There is also an extensive literature exploring monetary shocks in Europe, although the
changing institutional environment makes it less conclusive. Barran, Coudert, and Mojon
(1996), Ramaswamy and Slok (1998), and Dornbusch, Favero, and Giavazzi (1998) analyze
themonetary transmission across countries in Europe before Eurowas introduced and finds
that European countries respond similarly to the monetary shocks but with different
magnitude. Since the data used by these studies are before EMU was established, they
only consider monetary policy effects and/or interest rate changes for each country sepa-
rately. After the Eurozone was established, there has been further studies considering the
effect of common Euro area monetary policy shocks. Georgiadis (2015) included ECB
intervention in addition to macroeconomic variables (output growth, inflation, etc.) to
analyze determinant of transmission of Euro area monetary policy and concludes that
economies of the Euro area countries are affected by the ECB’s monetary policy and
transmission of monetary policy in the Euro area countries differs. The results of his
research confirms to results of similar studies related to effect of monetary policy shock in
Eurozone (also see Ciccarelli, Ortega, & Valderrama, 2012; Georgiadis, 2014).
1Forward guidance is a change in the strategy of underpinning policy communication. The structure of FOMC
statements has been modified to include: (i) an economic outlook, in January 2000; (ii) qualitative statements
about future policy inclinations, in August 2003; (iii) calendar-based guidance, in August 2011; (iv) outcome-based
guidance, in December 2012. Quantitative Easing policies consist of purchases, by the central bank of specified
quantities of long-term financial assets. This could be separated into QE1, (late 2008–2009) and QE2 (2010 q2–2011
q2). While QE1 consisted of purchases of MBS, Treasuries and Agency securities, QE2 focused only on the purchase of
long-term Treasury securities. The Fed intervened in both Treasury and mortgage securities in QE1 and QE2.
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We analyze the effect of monetary shocks on sovereign risk using two monetary
measures. The first one is the ECB refinancing rate and the second one is broad money
aggregate (M3). M3 is the broadest measure of money supply, and Euro area M3 money
supply includes following items; (i) liabilities of the money-issuing sector and central
government liabilities with a monetary character held by the money-holding sector, (ii)
currency in circulation, (iii) overnight deposits, (iv) deposits (v) repurchase agreements
(vi) money market fund shares (vii) debt securities up to 2 years. Changes in both
monetary variables are assumed to be exogenous to individual Eurozone countries’
sovereign risk, once interdependence is taken into account.
3. GVAR model
We use a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model to capture time-varying interdepen-
dence of sovereign risk (see Dees, Mauro, Pesaran, & Smith, 2007; Diebold & Yilmaz, 2009,
2009; Di Mauro & Pesaran, 2013; Favero, 2013). Our baseline specification is
ΔðSit  SgtÞ ¼ βi0 þ βi1ðSit  SgtÞ þ βi2ΔRiskAvit þ βi3ðDit  DgtÞ þ βi4ðBit  BgtÞ (1)
þ βi5lnðECBÞit þ βi6lnðM3Þit þ βi7lnðOilÞit þ βi8Wdit1 þ βi9Wbit1 þ uit;
ut , i:i:d: 0;ð Þ;
i¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N; t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;T;
where ut is the collection of shocks for the N countries and  is a N  N variance-
covariance matrix of contemporaneous shocks interdependence. The dependent vari-
able is the monthly change in the spread of country i CDS of 5 years sovereign bond
with respect to German (g) Bund for a given period t, ðSit  SgtÞ. The first determinant
of sovereign risk is the country’s fiscal fundamentals. We use two proxies for country’s
macroeconomic and fiscal conditions: debt to GDP ratio (Bit) and deficit to GDP ratio
(Dit). Second and third determinants are global risk aversion (ΔRiskAVit) and monetary
policies, which are proxied by lnðECBÞ, the logarithm of the ECB refinancing rate and
lnðM3Þ, the logarithm of M3. Finally, we also consider oil prices (in logs) as a proxy for
global shocks that might affect the sovereign risk in Euro area. These common variables
are treated as exogenous.
The GVAR specification allows for time-varying interdependencies among countries.
A time-varying weighting matrix captures the importance and influence of country j on
country i‘s economy. Following Favero (2013) we employ fiscal fundamentals as distance
between countries to construct the interrelation matrix of the GVAR specification. The
interdependence appears explicitly in the two variables Wdit1 for debt to GDP ratio and
Wdit1 for deficit to GDP ratio, where other countries influence is based on Maastricht
Treaty framework for time t as
distBji;t ¼ Bj;t  Bi;t
 =0:6; and distDji;t ¼ Dj;t  Di;t
 =3 (2)















The contemporaneous global CDS spreads (Wbit andW
d
it) are not included in the model like
a standard GVAR model, because these variables are unlikely to be exogenous due to low
number of cross-section units. Therefore, we use lags of global spread in our specification.
4. Data
4.1. CDS and other variables
A credit default swap (CDS) is a swap contract in which the protection buyer of the CDS
makes a series of premium payments to the protection seller and, in exchange, receives
a payoff if the bond goes into default. CDS is a direct measure of the default risk but not of
the probability of default, as the price of a CDS depends both on the probability of default
and on the expected recovery value of the defaulted bond. Moreover, such measure is not
perfect; CDS differentials might also reflect the different liquidity of different sovereign
CDSs, as well as counterparty risk (i.e., the risk that the protection seller of the CDS is not
able to honor her obligation when the bond goes into default).
Data on daily CDS with maturities between 1 and 10 years are provided by
Bloomberg and S&P Capital-IQ starting from 2006. In particular, we consider the
monthly mean of 5 years CDS on sovereign bonds. The primary goal of this paper
is to analyze the effect of monetary policy on Euro area countries sovereign risks,
as measured by 5 years CDS bonds. We focus on 10 countries: Austria, Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The
sample has monthly frequency and runs from January 2006 to December 2014.
Considering the findings of Bernoth et al. (2012) on Germany’s “safe-haven” status
in Euro area, the CDS relative to German Bund reveals the risk that an investor takes by
buying a specific sovereign bond. Therefore, CDS data used in our study is the spread to
CDS of German Bund.
If the country’s fiscal position degrades in comparison to the benchmark country
(Germany in our case), the CDS of government bond spread increases due to demand
of higher default risk premium. Debt to GDP and fiscal deficit to GDP ratios are the
most common fiscal variables used as a proxy of country-specific credit risk.2 We use
both variables constructed from Eurostat. Since these variables have quarterly fre-
quency, we interpolate data from quarterly to monthly using cubic splines.
We also include US corporate long-term Baa-Aaa spread (as perMoody’s rating scale) in
our analysis in order to control for time-varying global risk aversion which is a conventional
measure in the related literature (Bernoth & Erdogan, 2012; Bernoth et al., 2012; Codogno
2Some studies that use debt to GDP ratio as credit risk indicator are Favero and Missale (2012); Favero (2013);
Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009); Beirne and Fratzscher (2013); Bernoth and Erdogan (2012); Bernoth et al. (2012);
Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013). Credit risk is proxied by deficit to GDP in Bernoth and Erdogan (2012);
Bernoth et al. (2012). Beirne and Fratzscher (2013); Lane (2012); de Grauwe and Ji (2012) use current account deficit
or fiscal balance in their studies.
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et al., 2003; Favero, 2013; Geyer et al., 2004). When there is high uncertainty in the market,
the investors prefer safer bonds to riskier corporate bonds. Therefore, the difference
between low-grade bond (Baa) and high-grade bond (Aaa) increases.
4.2. Unit root and structural break tests
We present the results of unit root tests in Table 1. The t-statistics reported in the table
are for Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron unit root tests that corre-
spond to the statistics with the longest significant lag and four lags, respectively. The lag
length used in ADF unit root test is selected by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
based on the standard ADF regressions. In addition to the result of unit root test for
individual countries, we also include results for panel data. We run the unit root tests
using time trend and a constant.
Our results point out that CDS of 5 years government bonds has unit root for all
countries apart from Netherlands according to ADF. However, the version of CDS that
we use in our model, CDS of sovereign bond relative to CDS of German Bund, are
stationary for all countries and also for the pooled panel. Unit root test of all explana-
tory variables, that we include in our baseline mode, are also reported in Table 1. Debt/
GDP ratio relative to Debt/GDP ratio of Germany is the only variable in our model that
has unit root. Favero (2013) states that non-stationary exogenous variables can be used
in GVAR models, and therefore we employ Debt/GDP ratio relative to Germany.
Structural breaks are likely to be observed in economies that are subject to
significant political, social and economic events. The fact that country-specific
GVAR models are specified conditional on foreign and global variables should some-
what eliminate the structural break issue. Since the GVAR framework is vulnerable to
this problem (Dees et al., 2007), we run three tests: (i) possible breaks in our
dependent variable, (ii) possible breaks in the regression, (iii) confirmation of on
whether break dates apply to all countries.
We apply Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) structural break tests in CDS of sovereign
bonds over CDS of German Bund for nine countries in the Eurozone in order to
determine the periods where trend of CDS statistically changes at 5% significance level.
Figure 2 shows QLR statistics of the structural breaks in CDS from 2006 to 2014 for
each country. Apart from Belgium and France, sovereign risk trends of all other
countries is affected by 2007–2008 financial crisis. Almost all countries’ risks show
structural change for the Greece debt crisis in 2012, only the trend of sovereign risk for
Netherlands is not affected by 2012 debt crisis.
We also run the QLR test for unknown dates to determine structural breaks in
country-specific models and report our result in Figure 3. There is statistically signifi-
cant variation in the structure of the model for almost all countries. In line with the
QLR results in variable level, only Netherlands has no structural changes in the model.
Finally, we apply Chow tests for each possible break point that we got using QLR tests,
September 08, April 10 and April 12, and present results in Table 2. We run regressions
for each country separately and the only possible break that affects all countries is Apr’12,
which is the closest period to the Greece debt crisis.
Overall, not surprisingly, there is strong evidence of structural instability and almost
all countries are affected by recent financial and debt crisis. Therefore, we also run our
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baseline GVAR model before and after the 2012 Greece debt crisis in order to detect the
changes in the effect of domestic and foreign variable on sovereign risk.
5. GVAR results
In this section, we present and interpret the result of seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) using GVAR models and impulse response functions (IRF) for country-specific
shocks and monetary shocks.
Table 1. Unit root tests.
Variable ADF at level ADF at first difference PP at level PP at first difference
CDS of 5 years bond relative to CDS of German Bund with same maturity
Austria AT −2.280 −6.432*** −2.341 −8.924***
Belgium BE −1.723 −6.475*** −1.529 −7.677***
France FR −1.639 −6.158*** −1.618 −7.974***
Greece GR −2.820 −11.853*** −3.335* −16.550***
Ireland IE −0.868 −4.906*** −1.047 −9.252***
Italy IT −1.936 −5.473*** −1.812 −8.108***
Netherlands NL −3.576** −6.710*** −2.968 −7.224***
Portugal PT −0.889 −5.378*** −1.285 −10.530***
Spain ES −1.360 −6.492*** −1.187 −8.142***
CDS Panel 1.136 −18.254*** 2.247 −24.017***
Variable ADF at level ADF relative to GR PP at level PP relative to GR
Debt/GDP Ratio
Austria AT −3.326* −2.221 −2.405 −3.555**
Belgium BE −1.735 −1.807 −2.117 −2.316
France FR −1.970 −1.203 −2.058 −2.009
Greece GR −1.730 −1.976 −2.325 −2.666
Ireland IE −0.282 −0.921 −0.928 −1.352
Italy IT −1.213 −0.336 −1.799 −1.120
Netherlands NL −1.717 −1.497 −2.132 −2.311
Portugal PT −1.538 −1.708 −1.649 −1.860
Spain ES −4.250*** −2.518 −2.683 −1.950
Debt/GDP Panel −5.311*** −7.222*** 1.770 1.043
Variable ADF at level ADF relative to GR PP at level PP relative to GR
Deficit/GDPit Ratio
Austria AT −3.719* −3.427* −4.012** −4.452***
Belgium BE −4.968*** −4.810*** −4.199*** −4.200***
France FR −3.735** −3.195* −3.426* −3.942**
Greece GR −2.523 −2.985 −3.388* −3.757**
Ireland IE −1.943 −2.090 −2.621 −2.839
Italy IT −3.302* −2.829 −4.157*** −4.197***
Netherlands NL −1.995 −2.779 −3.446* −4.191**
Portugal PT −2.608 −3.990** −3.101 −4.101**
Spain ES −3.260* −4.228*** −2.871 −3.755**
Debt/GDP Panel −21.035*** −23.140*** −6.789*** −7.844***
Variable ADF at level ADF at first difference PP at level PP at first difference
Other Variables
ln(Oil) −1.606 −7.624*** −2.682 −7.760 ***
ln(ECB rate) −1.784 −9.274*** −1.953 −9.403***
ln(M3) −3.572** −8.502*** −3.674** −9.025***
Baa-Aaa(Risk) −1.732 −6.025*** −2.348 −5.882***
Notes: ADF: Augmented Dickey–Fuller with number of lags selected by AIC. PP: Philips–Perron test
results based on four lags.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.
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5.1. Seemingly unrelated regression model
We present the results of the SUR model for nine countries using the GVAR model in
order to analyze interdependence of countries in Euro area and other the factors that
affect country risks.
Table 3 covers all periods from the beginning of 2006 to the end of 2014. In order to
compare the changes before and after 2012 Greece debt crisis, we also run the same
regression for a sub-sample between January 2006 to March 2012, and another for April
2012 to Dececember 2014. The results for before and after 2012 Greece debt crisis are
provided in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
CDS spreads in differences are negatively affected by its lag for all countries, which is
in line with the findings of Favero (2013). However, Portugal presents a positive effect
when we include all periods in our analysis. When taking into account the subsample
before the 2012 Greece debt crisis, Portugal is also negatively affected by its CDS lag.
When M3 increases in the Eurozone, the government risk of almost all countries
decreases, except for Greece that is affected in the opposite direction. Similar results are
obtained for the effect of ECB refinancing rate. An increase in ECB refinancing rate
increases sovereign risk of all countries except Greece. Thus, we can conclude that
a tightening of the monetary policy (i.e., either M3 decreases or ECB increases) is thus
associated with an increase of the Eurozone countries’ CDS. The case of Greece
Figure 2. Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) structural break in CDS relative to German Bund.
Note: We check structural break in CDS for four lags. Vertical red lines represent August 08 for 2007–2008 financial crisis
and March 12 for 2012 Greece debt crisis, respectively. Horizontal black line is for critical value of F-test at 5%
significance level.
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deserves special attention. The results suggest that a monetary shock in the Euro area,
which increases the risk of government bonds of all countries, decreases sovereign risk
of Greece. This could be due to the fact that markets valuate Greek bonds in relative
terms to other countries in the Eurozone, and then, a tightening of the monetary policy
in the Euro-zone is perceived as positive for Greece as the rest of the countries will be
negatively affected. These effects are further studied in terms of IRF when we study the
effect of a monetary shock taking into account all interdependencies.
Table 2. Structural break test for baseline regression for known dates: September 08, April 10, April
12.
Fð9; nÞ Fð9; nÞ Fð9; nÞ
Country Code September 08 Prob April 10 Prob April 12 Prob
Austria AT 3.40*** 0.002 0.69 0.717 3.72*** 0.001
Belgium BE 2.90*** 0.006 3.50*** 0.001 4.98*** 0.000
France FR 1.51 0.167 3.04*** 0.005 1.72* 0.096
Greece GR 0.64 0.761 1.10 0.380 5.25*** 0.000
Ireland IE 1.37 0.224 1.71 0.109 2.72*** 0.008
Italy IT 1.36 0.226 2.80*** 0.008 3.12*** 0.002
Netherlands NL 1.30 0.262 3.82*** 0.001 11.57*** 0.000
Portugal PT 2.18** 0.035 2.01* 0.052 5.86*** 0.000
Spain ES 1.09 0.385 1.96 1.38 0.218 0.053
Notes: We apply the Chow test for each break separately. After confirming that April 2012 is break point for all
countries, we drop observations which date is greater than April 2012 in order to test break for September 2008 and
April 2010. Therefore, we were able to test if there is a second common break in the dataset.
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%.
Figure 3. Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) structural break in regression.
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As anticipated, there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and sovereign
bonds’ CDS for almost all countries, but this is statistically significant only for Austria
and Italy (an increase in uncertainty for the corporate bond market leads to a rise in
sovereign risk). When looking at the differences between the two subsamples, we
observe that while risk aversion is not statistically significant for all countries in the
2006–2012 sample, it is positive and statistically significant for most of the countries in
2012. Thus, this reveals that the European market association to global risk changed
with the deterioration of the European economy post 2012.
The effect of fiscal fundamentals is rather heterogeneous. The complete sample do not
have the expected results: the projected deviations of local government debt with respect to
the German government debt is negative and significant in the cases of Belgium and
Greece, and positive in the case of Netherlands, while the projected deviations of local
government deficits from German deficits are positive and significant only for the
Netherlands. This lack of significance and incorrect sign is certainly due to the structural
breaks considered above. When we consider the pre-Greek crisis subsample, however,
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have the a positive and significant effect. This
effect is in general not statistically significant for the post-Greek crisis subsample.
Given the strong heterogeneity in the CDS regression models, a pooled panel data
regression model would not be recommended. Although not reported Swamy tests for
slope heterogeneity rejects the null hypothesis of parameter stability across countries.
5.2. Impulse response function analysis
The SUR analysis reveals great heterogeneity among countries. In order to study the dynamic
effects taking into account the interdependencies,we compute the IRFofdifferent shocks. In each
case, they correspond to a standard deviation of the variable for which we compute the shock.
Figures 4 and 5 show IRF of country-specific shocks. The first set of graphs present how
countries are affected by a shock in other countries (excluding Greece and a shock of the
country itself). The second set of graphs shows the effect of a shock in Greece and the
country itself. The largest effects are given by shocks fromGreece, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
A shock in Greece, Italy and Spain have in general a positive initial shock in all countries.
The Greek shock however generates large variation across time, as the initial positive shock
is followed by a negative one of smaller magnitude. The aggregated effect is positive.
Portugal, on the contrary, produces a large negative effect on other countries’ CDS.
Overall this suggests that shocks in the countries that were the most affected by the
European crisis have a large effect in the rest of European countries.
Figure 6 presents IRF for monetary shocks on countries’ CDS. The graphs on the left
show the monetary shocks in terms of money aggregate (M3) and those on the right
hand side the effect of a shock in the ECB refinancing rate.
An increase in the M3 money aggregate reduces sovereign risk for all countries except
Greece and Italy. Thus increasing liquidity in the Eurozone is considered a positive signal for
the CDS market. The largest effects are observed for Ireland, Portugal and Spain. When ECB
increasesM3, there is an initial positive effect on Greece (i.e., CDS of 5 years government bond
relative to CDS of Germany increases), which becomes negative the next period. The overall
accumulated effect is positive. Increasing the ECB rate increases risks for all except (again)
Greece and Italy. The largest effects are observed for Ireland and Portugal.
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Figure 4. Impulse response functions – all shocks except Greece and the same country.
Note: Shock of a standard deviation in ΔðSit  SgtÞ.
Figure 5. Impulse response functions – shocks of Greece and the same country.
Note: Shock of a standard deviation in ΔðSit  SgtÞ.
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The results above show that the CDS market is thus significantly affected by ECB
monetary policy, but there is also large heterogeneity in the effects. A tightening of the
monetary policy (i.e., reducing M3 or increasing ECB financing rate) increases sover-
eign risks for all countries except Greece (not clear for Italy). Note however, that there
is heterogeneity in the magnitude of the shock. In particular, Ireland, Portugal and
Spain (also Greece) show the largest effects.
The opposite effect on Greece could be interpreted as a differentiation effect. The
Greek performance has been very weak for many years, and there has been a strong
campaign to isolate Greek shocks from other countries. Our results suggest that this
campaign has been successful.
6. Conclusion
This paper draws attention to the Eurozone debt crisis and the sovereign bond spreads using
the CDS market. There is a positive relationship between risk aversion and sovereign bond
CDS for almost all countries, which becomes larger after the 2012Greek debt crisis. An increase
in ECB refinancing rate or a decrease in money aggregates (M3) increase risk of government
bond of all countries, except Greece that has the opposite effect. Greece is affected bymonetary
policies in a different way compared to all other European countries in our sample.
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